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Perceptual Framing of Homeland Security
Linda Kiltz and James D. Ramsay
ABSTRACT  
This article analyzes the  phenomenon of 
homeland security through the development 
of four conceptual lenses that were created 
out of the  existing literatures  in criminal 
justice,  public administration, organization 
behavior,  risk  management, international 
relations,  and the overlap between them. 
Using terrorism as  a proxy for the homeland 
security enterprise, these conceptual lenses 
include: (1) homeland security as  a criminal 
justice problem  which views terrorism  as  a 
crime; (2)  homeland security as  a 
international relations problem which  views 
terrorism as  a war; (3)  homeland security 
as an organization design problem  which 
views terrorism  as a  network  of sub-state 
transnational actors; and (4) homeland 
security as a collaborative nexus which 
views terrorism  as  a complex mixture of 
s o c i a l ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  e c o n o m i c ,  a n d 
environmental issues; that is,  lens  4 
represents  an overlap of lenses 1-3. Each 
conceptual lens consists  of theories, 
practices,  values, beliefs,  and assumptions 
that serve to  shape how  homeland security is 
conceptualized. We recognize that homeland 
security is a broad field applied science that 
incorporates natural, technological,  and 
manmade hazards  and threats.   Perhaps  to 
best exemplify the complex and evolving 
nature of the  homeland security enterprise, 
terrorism can be an effective proxy for how 
homeland security  might be conceptualized 
and how  a theoretical foundation might be 
structured.  These  conceptual lenses  highlight 
how  perceptual filters  can significantly alter 
how  individuals  and organizat ions 
understand and explain phenomena or 
events. 
INTRODUCTION
We see the world, not as it is, but as we are—
or, as we are conditioned to see it.
 - Steven R. Covey in The 7 Habits of Highly 
Effective People
Surprise occurs the moment we realize our 
view of the world no longer matches reality. 
 - Wayne Burkan in Wide Angle Vision
“Would you tell me, please, which way I 
ought to go from here?”  “That depends a 
good deal on where you want to get to,” said 
the Cat.   “I don’t much care where,” said 
Alice.  “Then it doesn’t matter which way you 
go,” said the Cat. “So long as I get 
SOMEWHERE,” Alice added as an 
explanation.  “Oh, you’re sure to do that,” 
said the Cat, “if you only walk long enough.”
 - From Alice’s Adventures in 
Wonderland, by Lewis Carroll
At  8:46  a.m.  on September  11, 2001, 
American  Airlines flight  11  crashed into the 
North  Tower of the World Trade Center  in 
New  York  City.  Initial reports by  the media 
stated that an  airplane had crashed into one 
of the towers in  what  to many  appeared to be 
an  accident of some kind.1  This belief was 
supported by  eyewitness accounts that 
described the airplane to news reporters as a 
small commuter  plane or  “a  smaller plane.” 2 
Sean  Murtagh,  a  CNN producer, stated 
minutes after  the attack,  “I just  witnessed a 
plane that appeared to be cruising  at slightly 
lower-than-normal  altitude over  New  York 
City, and it  appears to have crashed into – I 
don't  know  which tower  it  is – but  it  hit 
directly  in the middle of one of the World 
Trade Center towers.”3  When  Murtagh was 
asked about  the type of aircraft  he reported it 
was a  “two engine jet,  maybe a 737…a large 
passenger  commercial jet.” 4 In attempting to 
explain  what was happening  from  an accident 
narrative, the CNN reporter  asked Murtagh  if 
the plane had difficulty  flying  in which he 
responded, “Yes, it  did. It  was teetering back 
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and forth, wingtip to wingtip,  and it  looks like 
it  crashed into,  probably, twenty  stories from 
the top of the World Trade Center.” 5 
President  Bush  also reported that  he thought 
the initial crash  was an  accident: “I was 
sitting outside the classroom  waiting  to go in, 
and I saw  an airplane hit  the tower – the TV 
was obviously  on, and I use to fly  myself,  and 
I said, "There's one terrible pilot." And I said, 
"It must have been a horrible accident."6  
The idea  that this event  could have been  a 
terrorist  attack was not  evident  in  the initial 
news reports of the 9/11  attacks,  even  though 
in  1993  Ramzi Yousef,  a  nephew  of Khalid 
Sheik Mohammad (the mastermind behind 
the 9/11  attacks) and six  co-conspirators had 
detonated a  1,500  pound bomb in the 
underground parking  garage of the World 
Trade Center  that  killed six people and 
injured more than  1,000.7  The goal of this 
attack  was to devastate the foundation  of the 
north  tower  in  such  a  way  that  it  would 
collapse onto its twin, thus causing  the 
collapse of both. 8 As a  nation  we initially  did 
not perceive that  we were under attack by  al 
Qaeda  although  this organization  was 
responsible  for carrying  out  a  number  of 
highly  destructive suicide bombing  attacks 
against  the United States before 9/11 
including the 1998 attacks against  the 
American  embassies in  Nairobi,  Kenya, and 
Dar  es Salaam, Tanzania, and the attack on 
the USS Cole off the coast  of Yemen on 
October 12, 2000. This perception  rapidly 
changed,  however,  when United Airlines 
Flight  175  struck  the South  Tower  of the 
World Trade Center  at 9:03  a.m.  on 
September 11, 2001.  
Immediately  after  the second airplane 
crashed into the WTC,  reporters on  ABC,  Fox, 
and NBC news began  talking  about  a 
deliberate attack. Charles Gibson of Good 
Morning America stated, “It looks like a 
concerted effort to attack  the World Trade 
Center  in  New  York… A  concerted attack  is 
underway.” 9 One of the first  witnesses of the 
event  interviewed by  CNN reported,  “I 
believe it was intentional.  It  was flown 
deliberately  into the building… There was 
nothing wrong  with  the airplane.”10 President 
Bush  reported that when he was told that  a 
second plane had hit  the World Trade Center, 
“I knew  that when  I got  all the facts that we 
were under  attack, there would be hell  to pay 
for  attacking America.” 11  By  evening on 
September  11, 2001  the shock and surprise 
turned to anger  as Americans realized that 
America was under attack.
On that  day,  nineteen  men affiliated with 
al  Qaeda, an  Islamic  terrorist  organization, 
hijacked a  total of four  passenger  jets. 12 Two 
of these planes crashed into the World Trade 
Center,  one airplane crashed into the 
Pentagon  in  Arlington  County,  Virginia 
killing  184  people, and the last  aircraft 
crashed into a field near  the town  of 
Shanksville in rural Somerset  County, 
Pennsylvania  as passengers and members of 
the flight  crew  attempted to retake control of 
their  plane from  the hijackers.  Excluding  the 
nineteen  hijackers,  a  confirmed 2,973  people 
died and thousands were injured as a  result 
of these attacks. 13  
Since the 2001  attacks,  the term  homeland 
security  has been used regularly  in  the media 
and in our  daily  lexicon. Our “war  on 
terrorism” has had a  significant  impact  on US 
domestic and foreign policies and on  the lives 
of people throughout  the world. Fear of 
future terrorist attacks has spawned the 
development and creation of massive 
governmental  programs,  agencies, and 
policies aimed at protecting  our homeland. 
For  example,  at  the federal level,  a  massive 
reorganization  merged twenty-two distinct 
federal agencies into the Department  of 
Homeland Security; this was the largest 
restructuring  of the federal  bureaucracy  in 
fifty  years.14 It  is clear  that  homeland security 
has been  a prominent  public policy  focus 
since September 11, 2001  in  part because 
overwhelming  government  response was 
needed to protect the United States from 
future terrorist  attacks,  and because political 
and public expectations made it so. 
DEFINING HOMELAND SECURITY
Though  the term  homeland security  is 
used in  our common  language on  a  regular 
basis, a  review  of the literature shows that 
there is no consensus on the meaning of 
homeland security.  A  frequently  cited 
definition  of homeland security  is from  the 
2002  National Strategy for Homeland 
Security.  The federal  government defined 
homeland security  as “a  concerted national 
effort  to prevent  terrorist  attacks within  the 
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United States, reduce America’s vulnerability 
to terrorism,  and minimizing  the damage and 
recover  from  attacks that do occur.” 15  This 
definition  has been  expanded under 
President  Barak Obama  to include other 
hazards after  the catastrophic events of 
H u r r i c a n e K a t r i n a . T h e O b a m a 
administration's current  strategy  focuses on 
terrorism  as the foremost of many  threats, 
defining  homeland security  as "a  concerted 
national effort  to ensure a  homeland that  is 
safe, secure,  and resilient  against  terrorism 
and other  hazards, where American  interests, 
aspirations, and way  of life can thrive."16 The 
most current  federal  definition of homeland 
security  reflects much  of what the nation  has 
learned about  homeland security  policy, 
strategy,  and tactics over  the last decade.  It 
arises from  the February  2010 Quadrennial 
Homeland Security Review  (QHSR) which 
refers to homeland security  as an  enterprise, 
or  an  inherently  collaborative and joint  effort 
of federal,  state,  local, tribal, private sector, 
and nongovernmental  partners with  a 
common interest in the well being  and public 
safety of America. The QHSR states: 
H o m e l a n d s e c u r i t y  d e s c r i b e s t h e 
intersection  of  evolving threats and hazards 
with  traditional  governmental and civic 
responsibilities for  civil  defense, emergency 
response, law enforcement, customs, 
border control, and immigration. In 
combining these responsibilities under one 
overarching concept, homeland security 
breaks down  longstanding  stovepipes of 
activity that have been and could still be 
exploited by  those seeking to harm 
America.17 
The conceptual lenses in  this article were 
developed because there  is no coherent 
theory  to date that  explains the phenomenon 
of homeland security  and are built  on the 
assumption that  the primary  focus of 
homeland security  is on  the threat of 
terrorism  versus natural  hazards.18  One 
method that can  be used to begin  to build a 
theory  of homeland security  is to adapt  and 
blend applicable  theories from  a  number  of 
academic  disciplines that  have relevance to 
homeland security issues and challenges.  
The terrorist  attacks on  the World Trade 
Center  in 1993  and in  2001  and our 
government’s response have been  explained 
in  part by  theories from  the fields of political 
s c i e n c e ,  c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e , p u b l i c 
administration, sociology,  and others. 
However,  each  of these discipline-specific 
theories and their  corresponding paradigms 
offer  but  a  piece of the picture in 
understanding  homeland security  policy  and 
the threat  of terrorism  as a  social and 
political phenomenon.  The purpose of this 
article is to gain  a  better  understanding  of 
homeland security  by  looking at  this 
phenomenon  through multiple conceptual 
lenses or paradigms.  
Paradigms are “a  set  of assumptions, 
concepts,  values and pract ices that 
constitutes a way  of viewing reality  for  the 
community  that  shares them,” especially  in 
an  academic discipline.19 A  paradigm  shapes 
how  we see the world and helps to explain  the 
world to us.  Paradigms are like internal maps 
that  we carry  with us in  our brains, often 
subconsciously,  in  the form  of images, 
assumptions,  stories, theories, and principles, 
that  condition how  we perceive the world, 
make judgments, and solve problems.20 Our 
paradigms are formed not  only  by  our early 
experiences as children within our  families 
and communities,  but  also through  our 
educational experiences and training.  More 
importantly,  paradigms heavily  influence 
how  we see current  events as well  as whether 
we will  be aware of new  problems,  how  we 
perceive and understand new  phenomenon, 
and how we choose to solve problems.  
For  example, immediately  following the 
events of 9/11,  homeland security  was largely 
viewed as a  series of efforts designed to 
counter  terrorism.  For  example,  President 
Bush  declared that  “homeland security 
encompasses those activities that are focused 
on  combating terrorism… Such activities 
include efforts to detect,  deter,  protect 
against and,  if needed,  respond to terrorist 
attacks.” 21 Given  the above statement,  what 
first  comes to mind when  you  read the term 
deter? What  is meant by  the concept  of 
deterrence as it relates to terrorism? A  law 
enforcement officer  or  a  scholar  in 
criminology  would mostly  likely  have very 
different  definitions and theories of 
deterrence than  someone who works in  the 
military  or  a scholar  in  international  relations 
or risk management.  
For  criminologists, deterrence occurs 
when  someone refrains from  committing a 
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crime because he fears the certainty, 
swiftness,  and severity  of legal punishment.22 
Deterrence from  an international relations 
perspective, on  the other hand, refers to a 
policy  aimed at dissuading  an  adversary 
(usually  a  nation state) from  using  military 
force to achieve its foreign  policy  objectives 
through  the threat  of military  retaliation. 23 A 
risk management  perspective of deterrence 
might  include the effects of failed control 
procedures, including  the relative inability  to 
safeguard assets or  to ensure accurate 
reporting.  If we take the term  deterrence 
from  criminology, we would assume that  we 
are going  to deter  terrorism  by  passing new 
legislation  raising  the penalties for  specific 
criminal  acts that  may  be defined as 
terrorism. However, if we use the theories of 
deterrence from  an international relations 
perspective, we would assume either  covert 
intelligence operations or  military  action 
would be used against terrorist  threats. Both 
of these uses of deterrence pose unique policy 
solutions that  may  not be effective against 
some forms of terrorism  we are likely  to face 
in the future.
BUILDING A THEORY OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY USING 
MULTIPLE FRAME ANALYSIS
In  order  to understand the challenges in 
developing homeland security  theory, it  is 
critical to incorporate the complex  and 
dynamic  nature of the homeland security 
enterprise.  However,  rather than  trying  to 
understand each  of the many  challenging 
issues characterizing homeland security  at 
the same time, it is logical to simplify  the task 
by  concentrating on  a  single challenge. For 
this article, we choose the challenge of 
terrorism. In turn,  three perspectives,  or 
conceptual  lenses,  are identified from  the 
l i t e r a t u r e t h a t c a n e a c h  b e u s e d 
independently,  or  in  combination, to 
understand the problem  of terrorism. The 
lenses derive from  the criminology  and 
criminal  justice literature, the international 
re lat ions l i terature, and the publ ic 
administration  and polit ical science 
literature. Each conceptual lens in  multiple 
frame analysis consists of theories, practices, 
values,  beliefs, and assumptions that  serve to 
shape how  the threat of terrorism  is 
perceived as a  problem, and how  the problem 
should be resolved in  the form  of homeland 
security  policy  and programs. These 
conceptual  lenses highlight  how  perceptual 
filters can  significantly  alter  how  individuals 
and organizations understand and explain 
phenomena  or events. The first  lens, criminal 
justice, views terrorism  (the proxy  for 
homeland security) as a  criminal justice 
problem. The second lens views terrorism  as 
an  international relations issue.  The third 
lens views terrorism  as an  organization 
design  problem.  In  addition, a fourth  lens is 
described.  The overlap of the previous three 
lenses suggests that the homeland security 
enterprise might also be understood as a 
collaborative nexus of each  of the other 
viewpoints.  This article  will  describe the 
characteristics and assumptions of each  of 
these conceptual lenses based on  a 
comprehensive literature review  and their 
subsequent  application to homeland security 
as described in  the 2002  National Strategy 
for Homeland Security.  In  addition, this 
article will  demonstrate that  although  each 
lens has a  distinct contribution  to what 
homeland security  is,  each  of the lenses work 
together  on many  issues and challenges of 
homeland security  as a  collaborative nexus of 
methods and strategies.  Hence where the 
three lenses overlap offers a  distinct 
contribution to what homeland security  is as 
well.
The article  is organized as follows.  Part 
One describes the characteristics of the first 
lens,  homeland security  as a  criminal  justice 
problem, viewing terrorism  as a  crime. Part 
Two describes the second lens, homeland 
security  as an  international relations 
problem, viewing  terrorism  as war. Part 
Three describes the third lens, homeland 
security  as an  organization  design  problem 
that  views terrorism  as a  network. The 
characteristics of each  lens are based on 
those items most frequently  represented in 
the literature. However,  there is no one 
paradigm  or  clear  consensus in  the academic 
disciplines on  how  the entirety  of homeland 
security  is understood, and therefore what 
homeland security  policies might be most 
effective against the threat of terrorism.  
Scholars and practitioners in  criminal 
justice,  international relations,  and public 
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administration  bring different  educational 
backgrounds,  experiences,  values,  and beliefs 
to their  study  of historical events and new 
phenomena. Thus,  these individuals may  see 
completely  different  things when  they  look  at 
the same events. 24 (See figure 1.) Joel  Barker 
wrote,  “What may  be perfectly  clear  and 
visible to one person  is invisible to another 
because of differing  paradigms.” 25  As a 
caution, the  authors note that viewing  the 
world through  a  given  conceptual lens is like 
looking  at  a  distant object  through  a  straw; 
while it  allows a  person to focus on one 
specific aspect of an  issue,  the nature  of the 
perspective tends to oversimplify  complex 
issues by  blocking  out the larger  view. 
Similarly, it  may  also block the viewer’s 
ability  to look  at  the event from  an  alternative 
vantage point. Ultimately, given  the complex 
and dynamic nature of the homeland security 
enterprise,  if we are to understand it  we must 
find a  way  to consider homeland security 
issues and challenges, like terrorism,  from 
multiple perspectives.  Additionally,  we have 
to have the ability  to put  our  own  (perhaps 
preferred) perspective aside so we can 
understand homeland security  from  a  variety 
of points of view.  Thus,  to form  a  theoretical 
foundation  of homeland security, we will use 
multiple perspectives,  or lenses, to consider 
the challenge of terrorism. Each  conceptual 
lens will  be  described distinct theories, 
definitions, meanings, and strategies. (See 
Figure 1.)
Figure 1: Multiple Frame Analysis
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LENS I: HOMELAND SECURITY AS A 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROBLEM – 
TERRORISM IS VIEWED AS A CRIME  
By  looking at  terrorism  as crime and through 
a  criminal justice lens, key  characteristics of 
homeland security  and terrorism  are 
highlighted. First, the criminal  justice lens 
perceives terrorism  as a crime that  is 
politically  motivated.  Theodore Honderich 
defines political violence as: 
[The] use of force against persons or things; 
a use of force prohibited by law, directed to 
a change in  the policies, system, territory of 
jurisdiction, or personnel  of a government 
or governments, and hence also directed to 
changes in the lives  of individuals within 
societies.26  
Unlike other offenders investigated by  the 
FBI,  those identified as terrorists have 
committed or  are suspected of having 
committed crimes for political reasons. 
However  despite  the motivation, acts of 
terrorism  can  include crimes such  as murder, 
kidnapping, arson,  and destruction of 
property  which  are acts designated to be 
illegal by state and national criminal codes. 
Second, terrorism  is defined as an  act  of 
violence whose purpose is to coerce or 
intimidate a  government  or  population  to 
obtain  political  or  social benefits.27  For 
example the federal statutes on terrorism 
define international  and domestic terrorism 
as:
Activities that involve violent acts or acts 
dangerous to human life that are a violation 
of the criminal  laws of the U.S. or of any 
state, and appear intended to intimidate or 
coerce a  civilian population; to influence 
the policy  of  a government by  intimidation 
or  coercion; or attempt to affect the 
c o n d u c t o f  g o v e r n m e n t b y m a s s 
destruction, assassination or kidnapping.28 
What  distinguishes acts of terrorism  from 
common crimes is that  the act  is motivated 
by  political,  ideological,  and religious intent 
in  order  to create a  mood of fear  and that  the 
victims are always innocent.  
Third, terrorism  is distinct  from  ordinary 
domestic crime in  a  number of ways. 
Criminals are characterized as opportunistic, 
impulsive, self-centered,  and undisciplined.29 
For  most  criminals,  crime is a  way  for 
obtaining  goods and violence is employed as 
a  means to obtain  money  or material goods 
for  the criminal’s own  self-interest. 
Terrorists, by  contrast,  normally  plan  their 
operations and their  violent  acts are intended 
to have consequences (political or  social)  and 
make a  symbolic statement  about  a  political 
cause.30 In  addition,  terrorists are motivated 
by  ideology,  while criminals are generally  not 
committed to any  specific  ideology.  Finally, 
most criminals avoid committing  crimes in 
public and are oriented toward escape. 
Terrorists, however, use political  violence to 
gain public attention  for  their  cause; they 
train  and prepare for  their  missions, and are 
attack oriented.31
Fourth,  counter  terrorism  strategies to 
prevent and deter terrorism  can  be found in 
part in  crime prevention  and deterrence 
theories. A  primary  purpose of criminal law  is 
to deter  or  to dissuade a  person from 
committing  a  crime because he/she fears 
b e i n g  p u n i s h e d t h r o u g h  f i n e s o r 
incarceration.  Deterrence theory  from  the 
perspective of criminologists assumes that 
individuals are rational  actors who choose to 
obey  or  violate the law  by  a  rational 
calculation  of the risk of pain  from 
incarceration,  social  stigma,  or  death  penalty 
versus the potential pleasure and economic 
gain derived from  a  criminal act. 32 Homeland 
security  policy  since 9/11  has included 
activities focused on  deterring terrorism  by 
passing  legislation  (i.e.,  PATRIOT Act) that 
created new  terrorism  related crimes, such  as 
acts of violence against  mass transportation 
systems, and made penalties more severe for 
those convicted of such crimes.33 The primary 
weakness of using  legal sanctions as a 
deterrent  to terrorism  is that  the actual or 
perceived threat  of formally  applied 
punishment  by  the state has not  been  proven 
to provide a  significant marginal  deterrent 
effect  as it  does with  criminals. 34  And,  in 
addition,  the challenge presented by 
asymmetric transnational actors is that they 
are difficult  to prosecute by  US law.  This 
point  is made more significant given  the 
inability  to form  coherent international 
bodies, policies,  and laws that have 
reasonable potential  to be enforced so as to 
be able to deter  anything. Take for example 
the problem  Somali pirates pose to the 
international shipping community. 
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Law  enforcement  agencies often  employ 
crime prevention strategies to complement 
deterrence strategies. Among  the most visible 
crime prevention  measures are those that 
include various forms of target  hardening  and 
increasing  the physical security  of potential 
targets of crime. Target hardening  includes 
the installation  of locks,  bars for  windows, 
intruder  alarms, fences, and other  devices 
that  make crime more difficult to carry  out. 
Other  situational  crime prevention strategies 
include physical,  electronic, and procedural 
measures that serve to deter  criminals from 
attacking,  detecting them  if they  do attack, 
delaying them  so they  can  be apprehended, 
and denying them  access to certain  targets.35 
These types of measures were clearly  seen 
after  9/11  at  airports, government buildings, 
and port  facilities where new  fences, 
barricades,  scanners, and surveillance 
systems were adopted.  
Lastly, the criminal  justice  lens identifies 
homeland security  as a  criminal justice 
problem  that  should be handled by  local, 
state,  national,  and international law 
enforcement  agencies.  Law  enforcement 
agencies are concerned with  preventing  and 
deterring crime, gathering  evidence, 
determining  the guilt  of the individuals 
responsible for a particular  act,  and 
apprehending and bringing the perpetrators 
to trial.  The criminal  justice approach  offers a 
broad range of counterterrorist  strategies to 
deter, prevent,  and respond to terrorism  that 
is quite different  from  an  international 
re lat ions and organizat ional  design 
perspective. Because acts of terrorism  are 
inherently  criminal behaviors under  the laws 
of the nation  and states,  local  and state law 
enforcement  agencies play  a  major  role in 
counter  terrorism. In  many  state and local 
homeland security  plans, law  enforcement 
agencies are assigned tasks that  include 
g a t h e r i n g i n t e l l i g e n c e a n d s h a r i n g 
information  through  joint  terrorism  task 
forces,  protecting  key  infrastructure and 
assets, doing  surveillance and preventive 
patrols,  responding to bomb threats and 
o t h e r  d i s a s t e r s , a n d c o n d u c t i n g 
investigations. 36
The contemporary  criminal justice system 
in  the United States has played a  key  role in 
homeland security  when  terrorism  has been 
perceived as a  crime, because all parts of the 
criminal  justice system  are activated when  an 
individual or  group commits an  act of 
terrorism  within  the United States and they 
are caught, prosecuted,  and found guilty  of 
the crimes.  The criminal justice system 
consists of three main  components: law 
enforcement agencies charged with 
investigating crimes and apprehending 
suspects; the court  system  where a 
determination  is made whether  a  suspect  is 
guilty  as charged; and the correctional  system 
charged with  treating  and rehabilitating 
offenders and with incapacitating them.
In the criminal  justice lens,  local,  state, 
and federal law  enforcement  agencies play  a 
critical role in  homeland security. At  the 
national  level,  the Federal Bureau  of 
Investigation (FBI) has been  designated the 
lead federal agency  in  investigating  terrorist 
groups in  the United States and acts of 
terrorism  directed at  Americans overseas. 
The FBI received this authority  through  a 
series of presidential directives and 
legislation  including  President Reagan’s 
national security  decision  directive 30,37  the 
O m n i b u s D i p l o m a t i c  S e c u r i t y  a n d 
Antiterrorism  Act  of 1986, 38  and President 
Clinton’s Presidential Decision  Directive 39.39 
Although  the FBI has had this role for  over 
twenty  years, throughout  most  of the 1990s 
counterterrorism  was not  seen as the priority 
in  this organization.  Before 9/11, the highest 
priority  goal for the FBI was the reduction  of 
violent  crime,  including  organized crime and 
drug  and gang related violence.40  However 
since the terrorist  attacks on 9/11,  the highest 
priority  for  the department has been  to 
protect Americans by  preventing acts of 
terrorism.41  
The International Association of Chiefs of 
Police (IACP) argue that  all “terrorism  is 
local”  and that regardless of the global and 
international connections,  any  actual 
terrorism  attack is going to occur  at the local 
level and it  will  be local first  responders who 
will initially  deal with  the attack. 42 As first 
responders to a  terrorist  attack, local  police 
officers will  be responsible for  assessing  the 
crime scene for  hazards,  calling for and 
providing medical assistance, identifying 
victims and witnesses,  securing  the crime 
scene and physical  evidence, and notifying 
supervisors and investigators who will be 
handling the case.43  In  addition to 
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responding to and investigating terrorist 
attacks after they  occur,  local police are 
required to be more proactive in  preventing 
and detecting acts of terrorism  through 
intelligence gathering and analysis and by 
completing threat  and vulnerabi l i ty 
assessments in  their  jurisdictions. 44 From  the 
criminal  justice perspective, terrorism  is 
considered a  criminal matter  to be handled 
by  local,  state,  and national  law  enforcement 
agencies. Law  enforcement  is concerned with 
gathering  evidence,  determining  the guilt of 
the individuals responsible for  a  particular 
act,  and apprehending  and bringing  the 
perpetrators to trial. 
Criminal  justice is not only  viewed in  the 
United States as a  system, but  also as a 
process that  takes offenders through  a  series 
of decision  points beginning  with  the 
investigation of a crime and arrest of 
suspects, to adjudication  where guilt  or 
innocence is determined in a  trial,  and 
concluding  with  correctional treatment  and 
release. 45  While the actual  process is more 
complex than this and can  vary  based on if 
the crimes are classified as misdemeanors or 
felonies,  what is critical about  this process is 
that  it  is bound by  specific constitutional 
procedures and protections.  The formal 
justice process implies that criminal 
defendants charged with  a  serious crime are 
entitled to a  full  range of rights under  the law 
including the right  to refuse to answer 
questions when placed in police custody,  the 
right  to a  speedy  and public  trial by  an 
impartial  jury,  and the right  to have trial 
procedures subject to review  by  a  higher 
authority,  to name a  few. This lens identifies 
homeland security  as a  criminal justice 
problem  that is best  resolved by  utilizing the 
institutions and processes of the criminal 
justice system (see Table 1 for a summary).  
Table 1:  Characteristics of Lens I – Terrorism as a Criminal Justice Problem
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LENS II: HOMELAND SECURITY AS AN 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PROBLEM 
–TERRORISM IS VIEWED AS A WAR
This lens conceptualizes terrorism  as a  form 
o f w a r f a r e a n d i s g r o u n d e d i n a n 
international relations foundation,  thus 
presenting  key  characteristics that  are 
distinct  from  the other  lenses. First, 
homeland security  is linked to national 
security  in  protecting  the United States and 
its interests at  home and abroad.  In  the wake 
of the terrorist  attacks on  September  11, 
2001, the United States required a  guiding 
vision  to outline our  national strategy  to 
combat the terrorist threat  at home and 
abroad. Under  President George W. Bush five 
new  strategies were published,46 relating to 
specific aspects of homeland security  and 
combating  terrorism, in  addition  to an 
updated National Security Strategy . 
Although  there are many  definitions of 
national security,  the US armed forces 
defines national security as a:
…collective term encompassing  both 
national  defense and foreign relations of 
the United States. Specifically, the 
condition provided by: 1) a military or 
defense advantage over  any  foreign nation 
or group of nations; 2) a favorable foreign 
relations  position; or  3) a defense posture 
capable of successfully resisting  hostile or 
destructive action from within  or without, 
overt or covert.47  
While national  security  is typically 
considered the purview  of the military 
referring to the aggregate of foreign  and 
domestic security  issues facing  America, 
homeland security  might best be considered a 
civilian  function.  In  policy  and practice, the 
homeland security  enterprise includes the 
combined domestic efforts of federal,  state, 
local,  and private organizations focused on, at 
a  minimum,  preventing, deterring,  and 
responding to acts of terrorism  within  the 
homeland as well  as efforts to harden  and 
protect critical  infrastructure,  efforts to 
improve emergency  planning, response and 
recovery,  intel l igence gathering  and 
disseminating, and policy  development  that 
supports all these efforts.  
The 2002  National Security Strategy 
p r o v i d e s a  b r o a d f r a m e w o r k f o r 
strengthening US security  in  the future. It 
also identifies the national  security  goals of 
the United States, and describes the foreign 
policy  and military  capabilities necessary  to 
achieve those goals.  These goals included 
combating  terrorism  around the world by 
d isrupt ing and destroying  of these 
organizations,  strengthening  homeland 
security, and fostering  cooperation  with  allies 
and international organizations to combat 
terror. 48  
This link between  homeland security  and 
national security  is also highlighted in 
President  Obama’s National Security 
Strategy, 2010 (NSS). One of the significant 
differences between  the 2002  and 2010 
national security  strategies was President 
Obama’s decision to merge the concepts of 
national security  and homeland security 
more closely  as well as to abandon the 
doctrine of pre-emption. Obama  argued that 
the 2010  NSS complemented “our  efforts to 
integrate homeland security  with  national 
security, including  seamless coordination 
among  Federal, state  and local governments 
to prevent, protect against,  and respond to 
threats and natural disasters.” 49 Among  the 
major objectives of the 2010 NSS are to 
prevent terrorist  attacks on  and in  the United 
States through  the use of intelligence, law 
enforcement, and homeland security 
capabilities, and to disrupt, dismantle, and 
defeat  al  Qaeda  and its terrorist affiliates in 
Afghanistan,  Pakistan,  and around the 
world.50  The concept  of defeating  global 
terrorist  networks and insurgencies is 
supported by  military  and international 
relations theories that  view  terrorism  as a 
form  of asymmetrical warfare, which  is the 
next component of the international relations 
lens. 
Second, seen  through this lens, terrorism 
is perceived as a  strategy  of asymmetrical 
warfare that  is directed at people, particularly 
civilians and noncombatants, in  violation  of 
the laws of war.51  This perception  is clearly 
articulated by  President  Bush  in  the National 
Security Strategy of 2002, in  which  he states, 
“The United States is fighting a  war  against 
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terrorists of global reach. The enemy  is not a 
single political regime or person or  religion  or 
ideology. The enemy  is terrorism  — 
premeditated, politically  motivated violence 
against innocents.” 52  Terrorism  from  this 
perspective is an  act  of violence the purpose 
of which  is it  to coerce or  intimidate a 
government  or population  in  order  to obtain 
primarily  political goals but  the violence is 
perpetrated using  asymmetric methods and 
strategies.  
Presumably,  most  transnational  terrorist 
organizations realize they  are much  smaller 
and weaker  than  national armies and cannot 
fight  and win  the more powerful  side under 
conventional  rules of war. 53 This indeed is the 
heart  of the asymmetry  between  traditional 
military  power  and modern  terrorist 
organizations such  as al Qaeda  or  Hamas. 
Thus, the weaker  terrorist organization  uses 
unconventional  methods of fighting, such as 
the use of car  bombs and suicide bombers 
against  civilian targets, assassination  of 
political leaders,  attacks against  information 
systems and critical infrastructure, and 
environmental destruction.54 The attacks by 
al  Qaeda  on  September 11, 2001  revealed how 
unconventional  (asymmetric)  strategies can 
be effectively  used to inflict  mass casualties, 
and have tremendous political,  social and 
psychological effects. 
A  third element  of this lens is that 
terrorism  is a  form  of psychological  warfare 
that  targets civilians as a  means of instilling 
fear  in  a  population. Wheeler  writes, 
“terrorism,  a  psychological technique relying 
on  the effects of surprise and shock to 
unnerve or  to coerce,  aims at an  opponent’s 
eventual demoralization  and surrender  on 
the issue in  dispute.” 55 By  brutal acts against 
civilians, terrorists seek  to sow  fear  in  a 
population as a  whole  in  the hope that  this 
will destabilize the society  and alienate 
people from support of their government. 56
Fourth,  this lens recognizes that  terrorism 
is perpetrated by  individuals, domestic  and 
transnational groups,  and agents of nation-
states. Of particular concern  is state 
sponsored terrorism  and its impact on  the 
world system.57  International relations 
scholars have written extensively  about  how 
terrorism  can  be used as a  tool of foreign 
policy  by  nation  states as a  means of 
balancing  power in  the world system, of 
destabilizing  hostile regimes, and of avoiding 
direct military  confrontation with  a  more 
powerful nation  state.58 A  weaker  nation  state 
and transnational organizations will use 
terrorism  as a  foreign  policy  strategy  over 
conventional  warfare because conventional 
warfare will  simply  be too costly  in  terms of 
personnel and resources.  This was clearly 
seen during  the Cold War  where the former 
Soviet  Union was involved with  a  wide range 
of terrorist  movements throughout  the world 
that  attempted to destabilize and embarrass 
the United States and our  allies. 59  The 
behavior  of the former  Soviet  Union,  Iran, 
and other nation-states as state sponsors of 
terrorism,  as well  as the behavior  of 
transnational terrorist  organizations, can  be 
explained in  part by  a  wide range of 
international relations theories60
Within a  month  of the 9/11  attacks the 
United States launched a  large-scale military 
operation  in  Afghanistan  to overthrow  the 
Taliban regime harboring  al Qaeda,  to find 
Osama bin  Laden,  and to defeat terrorist 
elements in the country.  President  Bush 
warned that the United States would not  just 
respond after being  attacked in  the future, 
but would exercise  the right  to self defense by 
acting  preemptively  against terrorist 
organizations to prevent them  from  doing 
harm  against  our  nation.61  The doctrine of 
preemption – of attacking  an  enemy  based on 
legitimate evidence that  an  attack is 
imminent – replaced deterrence as a  key 
principle of US foreign  policy  under  the Bush, 
Reagan, and Clinton administrations.  
The doctrine of deterrence has been  a  key 
principle of US foreign  policy  since the 1950s. 
In its most general form,  deterrence is 
defined as the power to persuade one’s 
opponents that  the costs and/or  risks of a 
given  course of action  outweigh  its benefits.62 
Thus, an adversary  can  be deterred by  the 
threatened use of military  force,  as well  as by 
other  types of threats/rewards that  can 
include economic  or  trade sanctions or  the 
promise of economic aid.  To be a  credible 
deterrent  against  possible threats,  the United 
States must not only  maintain a  stable 
deterrent  posture by  having  a readiness to 
use military  force when  needed, but  also 
must  be able to convince an  adversary  that 
we have the will  and power  to punish  an 
adversary  severely. 63  Many  scholars have 
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noted that in  the 1980s and 1990s,  US foreign 
policy  failed to deter  terrorist  attacks because 
we failed to communicate to groups such  as al 
Qaeda that  the United States was willing  and 
able to inflict  significant damage on  their 
organizations in the event  of an  attack.64 In 
fact  prior  to 9/11, the United States had 
consistently  failed to retaliate in  any 
meaningful manner  against terrorist attacks 
by  Islamic radicals such  as those against  the 
World Trade Center  in  1993, the US 
embassies in East  Africa  in  1998,  and the USS 
Cole in Yemen  in  2000.  A  primary  weakness 
of deterrence theories in  international 
relations is that  many  are directed against 
nation  states, not individuals or  transnational 
terrorist  organizations, which  are today 
primarily sub state actors. 
In  the realm  of international relations, 
globalization  has had a  significant impact on 
actors in  the world system. Globalization is a 
dynamic process that  has involved the 
integration  of economic markets, nation-
states,  and technologies,  and has made the 
transnational movement of money,  goods, 
p e o p l e ,  a n d i d e a s m u c h  e a s i e r  t o 
accomplish.65 As a  result,  extensive webs of 
interdependence have been  created that have 
had negative and positive impacts on  the 
world system.  Among  the negative aspects is 
the anti-globalization  backlash  that  has 
arisen in some regions of the world.  A 
number  of scholars have argued that  the 
increased threat of transnational terrorism  in 
the post  Cold War  era can  be explained in 
part by  organizations and communities 
fighting against  globalization  and the spread 
of American  political,  economic, and cultural 
influence. 66 For  example, Samuel Huntington 
in  The Clash of Civilizations,  argued that the 
spread of western  influence militarily, 
economically,  politically, socially, and 
culturally  has created intense resentment 
among  Muslims and this will  result  in  future 
conflicts. 67  Further,  Benjamin  Barber  also 
argues that terrorism  is a  reaction to the 
international forces of globalization  because 
it  threatens traditional community  structures 
based on  kinship,  religion,  or  ethnicity. 68 
According  to economist  Joseph  Stiglitz,  anti 
globalization attitudes in  developing 
c o u n t r i e s a r e d u e t o t h e f a c t  t h a t 
globalization has made some of these 
countries worse off than  before,  including 
those in  the Muslim  world.69 In  the  Muslim 
world,  globalization  has not  only  been  seen  as 
a  force that  is undermining traditional values, 
but also as a  source of economic  exploitation 
by  the West,  particularly  the United States.70 
To kindle the anger  and frustration of the 
population and recruit  members to their 
ranks, radical elements within these societies, 
such  as Hamas or al  Qaeda,  make claims that 
wealthy  nations are exploiting  them  to gain 
more power  and wealth  at the expense of 
weaker  nation  states and communities.  Thus, 
terrorist  violence by  groups and individuals 
may  be the result  of feelings of intense anger, 
a g g r e s s i o n  a n d f r u s t r a t i o n  d u e t o 
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n d i t i o n s s u c h  a s 
globalization, deprivation or oppression. 71  
Finally,  the international relations lens 
views terrorism  as a  form  of warfare that  is 
an  international relations problem  that 
should be handled by  national intelligence 
agencies, the State Department, the National 
Security  Council, and the United States 
military.  Wherein  homeland security  issues 
are involved,  these agencies are focused on 
the national  security  of the United States and 
are concerned with  preventing, deterring, 
and responding  to international  terrorism 
through  a broad range of offensive and 
defensive counterterrorism strategies. 
Terrorism  experts of ten  organize 
counter terror i s t  opt ions into three 
classifications that  include: (1) diplomacy, 
financial controls,  military  force, intelligence, 
and covert  actions; (2) legal, repressive,  and 
conciliatory  responses to terrorism; and (3) 
targeted and untargeted prevention (i.e., 
target hardening).72  Counterterrorism 
options can vary  from  the use of military 
force and intelligence operations to 
diplomacy  and social reforms.  Military  forces 
are deployed in covert  operations using 
special operations forces, in  suppression 
campaigns using  military  strikes to destroy  or 
d i s r u p t  t e r r o r i s t  p e r s o n n e l a n d 
infrastructure,  and in  preemptive attacks to 
prevent terrorist  attacks in  the future. For 
example,  the United States responded to 
terrorist  acts of aggression  with  military 
operations in  Afghanistan in  response to 
9/11/01  as well as in  Libya  after the Berlin 
Disco bombing in 1986. 73  
Nonmilitary, repressive options include 
nonviolent  covert  operations such  as 
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disinformation  campaigns,  intelligence 
gathering  and analysis,  economic sanctions, 
and enhanced physical  security  of possible 
targets or  target  hardening. Conciliatory 
counterterrorism  options do not  involve the 
use of force or  other  repressive methods and 
can  include diplomacy  to negotiate 
acceptable resolutions to a  conflict,  and social 
reforms to address the root causes of 
terrorism.74   Legal responses to terrorism 
include actions, such  as economic or  trade 
sanctions instituted by  international 
organizations such  as the United Nations and 
World Court.  
Each  of these options has been used by 
various administrations to prevent, deter, 
and respond to terrorism, but  some of these 
options can  pose significant  ethical  and legal 
di lemmas for  pol icy  makers.75  The 
importance of preemption  and deterrence in 
preventing  terrorist  attacks by  transnational 
terrorist  organizations and nation  states is 
central  to the development  of these responses 
when  viewed through  the international 
relations lens. 76  Regarding  terrorism  and 
counter-terrorism,  this lens views homeland 
security  as an  international  relations problem 
that  is best  addressed by  utilizing  the 
institutions and processes of the US national 
security  apparatus (See Table  2  for 
Summary.)
Table 2:  Characteristics of Lens II – Terrorism as War
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LENS III: HOMELAND SECURITY AS AN 
ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN PROBLEM – 
TERRORISM IS VIEWED AS A NETWORK 
OF TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
In  Lens III – Homeland Security  as an 
Organizational Design  Problem/Terrorism  as 
Network – a number  of characteristics are 
highlighted.  This lens views homeland 
security  from  an  organizational  design  and 
public administration  perspective.  First,  this 
lens focuses on  the importance of the design 
a n d s t r u c t u r e o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t 
organizations tasked with  homeland security 
and counter-terrorism. The argument  is that 
rational, hierarchical,  bureaucratic designs 
and practices are likely  to face significant 
challenges in deterring, preventing, and 
responding to terrorism  attacks in  the future 
because they  are not well  suited for  operating 
in  complex,  unstable environments. Yet  in 
the wake of 9/11, passage of the Homeland 
Security  Act  of 2002  created one of the 
largest bureaucratic  organizations in 
Washington,  DC. The Department  of 
Homeland Security  (DHS) was created to 
centralize the resources and expertise of 
twenty-two diverse federal agencies into a 
supra-bureaucracy  ostensibly  in  order  to 
achieve greater  coordination  in  homeland 
security  within  federal agencies and with 
state and local  government  and the private 
sector. 
How  best  to accomplish  homeland 
security  is one of most complex  problems 
that  must be addressed by  our  elected leaders 
and government  organizations at  the local, 
state, and federal levels.  The coordinated 
execution  of agreed upon  programs and 
p o l i c i e s i n  h o m e l a n d s e c u r i t y  i s 
fundamentally  the responsibility  of not  only 
DHS, but also for  a  vast  network  of 
g o v e r n m e n t  a g e n c i e s , n o n p r o f i t 
organizations,  and private enterprises 
working  in  a  concerted effort to prevent, 
deter, and respond to terrorist  attacks within 
the United States.  Though  a  network  of 
organizations is involved in  these homeland 
security  efforts,  the primary  structure of 
government  organizations is a  hierarchical 
model with  bureaucratic organizational 
structures.77 Bureaucratic  structures are often 
described as having  a  clear  hierarchy  in 
which  there is supervision  of lower  offices by 
higher  ones,  a  clear  chain  of command and 
authority, established rules, policies and 
procedures (red tape), a  division  of work, and 
clear  lines of communication  which  is best 
suited for  stable and predictable work 
environments. 78  However,  organizations 
dedicated to homeland security  often  operate 
in  environments that  are dynamic, complex, 
and uncertain,  thus requiring  an  organic 
n e t w o r k  s t r u c t u r e t h a t  i s h i g h l y 
decentralized, flexible, and adaptable.79  The 
large-scale failure of the federal government 
in  responding to Hurricane Katrina  in  2005 
clearly  highlighted the coordination 
challenges faced by  traditionally  bureaucratic 
organizations.  
A  number  of public administration 
scholars argue that  network governance 
structures are the most  effective in 
responding to increasingly  complex  social 
and political problems that span across 
organizations and levels of government.80 
Network models of organizations and 
governance are significantly  different than 
hierarchical  models.81 First,  while hierarchies 
have a  single authority  structure created 
under a  chain of command,  networks have a 
divided authority  structure.  Second,  in  a 
hierarchical  structure activities are guided by 
clear  goals and well-defined problems, while 
in  a  network there are various and changing 
definitions of problems and goals.  Third, a 
network is a  highly  organic structure that is 
decentralized and may  integrate multiple 
levels of government  and a  variety  of private 
and nonprofit  organizations in  order  to 
deliver  a  service or  meet  policy  goals.  One of 
the greatest strengths of a  network structure 
is its ability  to bring together  a  group of 
experts and resources to solve  problems in a 
rapidly  changing  and shifting environment. 
These capabilities are critical in preventing, 
deterring, and responding  to the vast array  of 
threats to the homeland. Homeland security 
is a  shared responsibility  with Congress, state 
and local  governments,  the private sector, 
nonprofit organizations,  and the American 
people.  To effectively  integrate and 
coordinate these diverse stakeholders into 
homeland secur i ty  e f forts ,  network 
governance structures (i.e.,  fusion  centers, 
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interagency  policy  centers,  multinational  law 
enforcement, and data  sharing  Memos of 
Understanding, etc.)  will  need to be created 
and maintained at multiple levels.  
The next  element  of this lens focuses on 
the organizational culture, mission, and 
strategies of the agencies involved in 
homeland security. How  terrorism, as well  as 
other threats,  is defined and conceptualized 
is determined largely  by  the lead agencies 
involved in  homeland security,  particularly 
the Department of Homeland Security, 
Department  of Justice,  Department  of 
Defense, and the organizations associated 
with  national intelligence and national 
security. As a  result,  counterterrorism 
policies and programs will  take on  the 
character  of these organizations. For 
example,  the FBI has historically  taken a 
traditional law  enforcement  approach  to 
counter  terrorism  whereby  agents respond to 
crimes after  they  have occurred to gather 
evidence and build  a  case for  prosecution 
(this was clearly  seen  in  their  handling  of the 
1993  World Trade Center  bombing).  But 
following  9/11  and the subsequent  passage of 
the PATRIOT Act, the FBI has attempted to 
become more proactive. 
Strategy  is often  driven  by  policy, which  is 
in  turn  driven  by  world events. Strategic 
responses to policy  can  often  develop 
particular  organizational culture and 
structure. Chandler  defines strategy  as “the 
determination of the basic  goals and 
objectives of an  enterprise,  and adoption  of 
the courses of action  and the allocation  of 
resources necessary  for  carrying  out these 
goals.” 82  In  the public sector,  an  agency’s 
strategy  can  be articulated in  its enabling 
legislation  that  defines its purposes and by  its 
strategic  plans, mission  statements, policies, 
and adopted goals. For  example the 
Homeland Security  Act  of 2002  states the 
mission  of the Department  of Homeland 
Security is to: 
Prevent terrorist attacks within  the United 
States; reduce the vulnerability  of the 
United States to terrorism; minimize the 
damage, and assist in the recovery, from 
terrorist attacks  that do occur within  the 
United States; and carry  out all  functions of 
entities transferred to the Department, 
including  acting as a  focal  point regarding 
n a t u r a l  a n d m a n m a d e c r i s e s a n d 
emergency planning.83  
After  9/11, the FBI also changed its 
mission  priorities and identified prevention 
of terrorist  attacks as its number one priority. 
Both  these examples illustrate how  an 
organization  can  change its structure to 
accommodate a  shift in policy,  and strategy  – 
in  this case, a  greater  emphasis on  counter-
terrorism. Some have argued that  this focus 
on  terrorism  by  DHS left the agency 
unprepared for  large-scale natural disasters 
such  as Hurricane Katrina.84  The growing 
number  of natural  disasters combined with 
the increasing number of murders and drug 
related violence on  the US-Mexican  border, 
and the increasing  threats to our  cyber 
infrastructure led to a  significant  change in 
the mission  of the Department  of Homeland 
Security.   Under  President  Obama,  DHS has 
five homeland security  missions: (1) 
preventing  terrorism  and enhancing  security; 
(2)  securing and managing  borders; (3) 
enforcing  and administering immigration 
laws; (4) safeguarding  securing cyberspace; 
and (5)  ensuring resilience to disasters.85 
Strategy  formulation  and changes typically 
b e g i n  w i t h  a n  a s s e s s m e n t  o f t h e 
opportunities and threats in  the external 
environment  and is an  on-going  process for 
government organizations such as DHS.  
Organizational culture is very  important  to 
organizations and culture change is a  critical 
component of organizational  transformation. 
Organizational culture is defined as “the set 
of values,  guiding  beliefs,  understandings and 
ways of thinking  that is shared by  members 
of an organization  and taught  to new 
members as correct.” 86 Edgar  Schein  argued, 
“Culture matters because it is a  powerful, 
latent, and often  unconscious set of forces 
that determine both our  individual and 
collective behavior, ways of perceiving, 
thought patterns,  and values.” 87  In turn, 
cultural  elements determine strategy, goals, 
and modes of operating. For  example, 
because law  enforcement agencies, such  as 
the FBI,  perceive terrorism  as a crime,  their 
counterterrorism  strategies must be 
underpinned by  the guiding  principle of the 
rule of law  and implemented through  the 
criminal justice approach.  
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Understanding  organizational cultures 
helps to explain  some of the inter-
organizational and intra-organizational 
conflicts that  occur  in  implementing  policies 
and programs in homeland security.  A 
conflict highlighted in the 9/11  Commission 
Report  was between  the FBI and CIA  in 
sharing  intelligence information  on  suspected 
terrorists. An example of this conflict can be 
illustrated in  part  by  the drastically  different 
organizational  cultures and strategies of the 
intelligence community  and the law 
enforcement community.
The culture of intell igence-driven 
organizations differs from  those of pure law 
enforcement  organizations. 88 While  (foreign) 
intelligence organizations are interested in 
long-term  infiltration,  active and passive 
monitoring, and deterrence,89  the law 
enforcement  bias is to arrest  and prosecute. 
Also, the primary  goals of an  intelligence 
organization  include principle elements in 
the intelligence cycle such as: (1) determining 
what intelligence should be collected to 
advance national interests; (2) systematically 
collecting  that  raw  intelligence; (3)  applying 
analytical  tools to the raw  information in  the 
development of informed judgments; and (4) 
sharing  that finished intelligence with 
national level  policymakers and other 
officials with  a demonstrated need to know. 
“Tradecraft”  or  the how, where,  and why 
intelligence gathering  takes place,  is of 
utmost importance.90 Recruitment  of sources 
and penetration  of groups operating  in  the 
United States is highly  valued by  intelligence 
organizations.  Finally,  there are fewer  legal 
restrictions on overseas CIA  operations than 
FBI investigations at home or abroad. 
By  contrast, the primary  goal  of law 
enforcement  is to respond to criminal 
activities, and to deter future crimes.  In 
general,  this goal is achieved by  rigorous 
investigation of criminal activities and close 
cooperation  with  prosecutors. Discrete, 
individual criminal cases are the driving 
factor  in  law  enforcement  organizations, 
while broader  trends and relationships 
among  social  variables – such as political, 
economic, and military  factors – drive 
intelligence organizations.91  When  law 
enforcement entities operate within the 
United States, civil liberties and the rights of 
US citizens are of paramount concern. As a 
result,  the FBI is governed by  a  complex 
range of investigative guidelines and polices, 
and statutes and constitutional  limits when 
intelligence is being gathered in  the United 
States against  foreign  agents or  US citizens.92 
T h i s l e n s n o t  o n l y  f o c u s e s o n  t h e 
organizations involved in  homeland security 
but also on the organizational  structure of 
terrorist groups.
Threats to homeland security  come from 
terrorist  organizations or  movements often  in 
the form  of loosely  linked networks of varied 
groups. These groups can  range from  highly 
organized and trained operatives (e.g.,  Ramzi 
Yousef)  to groups of potential actors who lack 
training or  stable organizational  structures 
(e.g., Black September).  Today’s terrorist 
networks are different than past  terrorist 
organizations in  their  design, technology, and 
tactics and pose unique challenges.93  
Terrorism  research often  includes studies 
on  how  terrorist organizations are structured 
and how  these structures have changed and 
adapted to their  environment. In  the past,  the 
tendency  was to assume that  terrorists 
belonged to identifiable organizations with 
relatively  clear  command and control 
structures (pyramid organization) and a 
defined chain  of command,  as well as a 
defined set  of political,  social, and economic 
o b j e c t i v e s . 94  R e c e n t l y ,  t e r r o r i s t 
organizational  structures have evolved into 
more loosely  linked network structures to 
survive in  a  constantly  changing  threat 
environment  with  a  distributed control  and 
command structure (if one exists at  all).  As 
law  enforcement,  intelligence,  and military 
operations have successfully  found and 
c a p t u r e d o p e r a t i v e s i n  t e r r o r i s t 
organizations,  these groups have had to find 
new  ways to evade authority,  to become more 
adaptable and resilient,  and to ensure their 
organization  would survive if the main 
leaders were captured or killed.95  
Arquilla  and Ronfeldt,  in  their  study  of 
terrorist  organizations, define a  network as “a 
set  of diverse,  dispersed nodes that  share a 
set  of ideas and interests and are arrayed to 
act in  a  fully  intermitted networked 
manner.96  Arquilla  and Ronfeldt argue that 
these networks have little or  no hierarchy  or 
official authority.97 Also decision-making and 
operations are decentralized; thus tactical 
operations can  be initiated and carried out 
KILTZ & RAMSAY, PERCEPTUAL FRAMING OF HS  15
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS VOLUME 8, ARTICLE 15 (AUGUST 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
locally  without central leadership.98  The 
n e t w o r k o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f t e n h a s a 
decentralized cell structure consisting  of a 
small group of people and a  team  leader.  The 
leader  is usually  the person  with  the most 
experience; he or  she is responsible for 
ensuring  the tasks of the cell are  carried out 
and for  communicating  and coordinating 
with  other  cells. Since 9/11, al Qaeda  has 
made numerous transformations and has 
morphed into a  multidimensional network  of 
networks. The challenge in  homeland 
security  is in  designing  governance structures 
and networks that are effective  and efficient 
at  preventing, deterring, and responding  to 
terrorist  attacks and other  natural and 
manmade hazards.  (See Table 3  for  a 
summary of this lens.)
Table 3:  Characteristics of Lens III – Terrorism as a Network
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LENS IV – HOMELAND SECURITY AS A 
COLLABORATIVE NEXUS OF NETWORKS, 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS – 
TERRORISM IS VIEWED AS A COMPLEX 
MIXTURE OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS99
The previous discussion indicates that 
homeland security  may  appear  to function 
differently  depending on  one’s viewpoint. It 
fol lows that  homeland security  can 
legitimately  be “in the eye of the beholder;” 
that  is,  homeland security  means different 
things to different  people. Further,  the 
previous discussion  indicates that the 
policies,  strategies, and even  the tactics 
employed in  the ongoing  struggle against 
transnational, asymmetric terrorism  would 
be different when  conceived and executed 
through  one lens as opposed to another. 
Referring again to Figure 1, it  becomes 
apparent  then  that perhaps it  makes sense to 
investigate what  the overlap in the three 
lenses may  mean; that  is,  that the overlap 
itself is a  separate lens with  which  to view 
homeland security  strategies, organization, 
operations,  or  tactics.  We will explore the 
emergent construct  of environmental security 
as an exemplar of this lens.
Consistent  with a multi-lens theory  of 
homeland security,  we have described the 
term  “homeland security”  as a  construct that 
tends to be dynamic  (e.g.,  its meaning 
changes over  time),  and is value-laden (e.g.,  it 
can mean different  things to different 
constituents).  Understanding  that what  is 
and what is not homeland security  is also 
context  dependent,  enables it to be addressed 
in  a  wide spectrum  of levels of analysis 
(ranging  from  individual  to global/
transnational)  and policy. In  order  to 
properly  frame the importance of global 
climate and public  health  in  a  security 
paradigm,  there are several major  forms or 
frameworks of conceiving security  that are 
pertinent  to consider.  These include the 
concepts of transnational,  international,  and 
national  security; homeland security; 
environmental security; and human security.  
In  2010, Pakistan  experienced its worst 
flooding  in  a century,  and Russia  was plagued 
with  record heat and widespread wildfires 
that  choked the region with  smoke and killed 
hundreds. Both  of these events were related, 
and were potentially  tied to climate change, 
which  may  have contributed to an  unusual 
alteration  in the high  altitude jet  stream. This 
unusual phenomenon brought both  the 
devastating heat  to Russia  and helped push 
large amounts of moisture-laden  air  into 
Pakistan,  where almost  20  percent  of the 
country  was flooded.  In  addition, both  the 
record flooding  in the American Midwest, 
and second most  deadly  tornado season 
(killing almost 500 people)  occurred in  2011. 
All  of these events may  eventually  be tied in 
part to global  warming-related weather 
pattern/climate changes,  but regardless of 
the causality  of these specific  events, these 
are but  a  few  of the types of extreme climactic 
events that  are predicted by  climate change 
models. What  the field of environmental 
security  is primarily  concerned about is the 
relationship between global and regional 
climates and how  that  influences cascading 
failures in human and ecological systems. 
Global  warming  and the resultant  changes 
to climate around the world are among the 
biggest  challenges humanity  faces.  As such, 
policy  makers and security  strategists should 
not consider  global warming  a distant  or 
abstract problem.   Rather climate change/
global warming  represent  a  challenge that all 
nations need to participate in  solving.  And 
taken  together  with  various other related 
challenges including  peak oil (and related 
energy  resource pressures),  growing  water 
and food shortages, and population  growth, 
transnational  crime and asymmetric 
insurgencies,  combine to become a  more 
significant human  security  concern.100  As 
discussed below, governments and militaries 
around the world, including  the United States 
Pentagon, have begun to recognize this 
concern.  For  example,  hunger  is already  a 
rising global  problem,  reducing decades-long 
improvements. This has been caused in  part 
by  rising  food and fuel prices, which  will vary 
but worsen overall with  reduced oil and gas 
supplies caused by  “peak oil”  production 
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drops.  Rising  hunger  has respectively  been 
the result of crop failures and water shortages 
from  climate change, and rising  demand from 
both  population  growth  and rising  demand 
for  high-quality, high-input  foods like  meat 
(the latter  related to rising  wealth  in 
countries like India,  Brazil and China). Many 
food,  water,  and oil-stressed poorer  nations 
have reached political  and social tipping 
points that  culminate in  mass migrations or 
social  and political unrest which  can 
eventually  lead to their  governments failing 
(e.g.,  failed states and large scale regional 
disruptions such  as the Arab Spring 
uprisings).   
As a  part of the larger  domain  of 
homeland security,  the main goals of 
environmental  security  (ES) include 
stabilizing natural  systems that  ultimately 
impact national  security,  including  those 
systems affected by  global warming.  Hence 
the concept  is that  sustainable natural 
systems lead to sustainable security.  Hunger, 
water  and fuels shortages, and disease each 
adds to the misery  felt by  society  and to 
political instability.  Subsequently,  political 
instability  tends to motivate radical acts, 
terrorism, wars,  and other  political  violence 
and economic  distress as we have recently 
witnessed in  the conflicts in  northern Africa 
and the Middle East. Therefore, ES 
challenges traditional security  concepts by  its 
focus on mitigation  strategies such  as (1) 
building  sustainable economic  systems and 
reducing population  growth rates as much  as 
possible; (2) eliminating/reducing  poverty 
and enhancing  education,  which  would help 
stabilize population  growth  and build a 
healthier  and an  employable population  base; 
(3) stabilizing and restoring  Earth’s critical 
environmental systems, such as forests, soil, 
oceans and fisheries,  and fresh  water  supplies 
that  will  support  future economic activity  and 
growth; (4) reducing  greenhouse gas 
emissions, to reverse the rising  atmospheric 
levels from  their  current,  and future, 
unsustainable levels; and (5) achieving 
sustainable energy  policies,  including 
improved energy  efficiency  (better  use of 
energy  consumed)  and alternative energy 
sources (such  as solar,  wind,  geothermal,  bio-
fuels, etc.)  to replace the fossil fuel shortages 
already looming.  
By  its nature,  environmental  security 
challenges certain  traditional notions of 
national security  and homeland security.  ES 
must  include many  non-traditional security 
players – including agencies such  as the 
Environment  Protection  Agency  (EPA),  the 
N a t i o n a l A e r o n a u t i c s a n d S p a c e 
Administration  (NASA), and independent 
and government  scientists doing research  on 
climate change-related issues, technologies, 
etc. Even  some states, such  as California, 
have independently  enacted climate security-
related legislation  to reduce GHG  emissions 
through  regulation  and tax  incentives. 101  In 
light of the intersection  of global climate 
change and the resulting  impact on  the 
political economies and governments around 
the world,  we might  define environmental 
security as:
An  interdisciplinary  study  of the affects  of 
extreme environmental  or climatic events 
which  can  act locally  or  trans-nationally to 
destabilize countries or  regions of  the world 
resulting in  either  geopolitical instability, 
resource conflicts  or vulnerabilities  in 
critical  infrastructure, or some combination 
of these. 
The discussion  above clearly  points out 
how  environmental security  exemplifies the 
overlap of the international  relations, 
criminal justice, and networks lenses. 
Recently  the 2010  QDR recognized for  the 
first  time the national  security  implications of 
climate change and energy  dependence by 
stating: 
The rising demand for resources, rapid 
urbanization  of littoral  regions, the effects 
of climate change, the emergence of new 
strains of disease, and profound cultural 
and demographic tensions in several 
regions are just some of the trends whose 
complex interplay may spark or  exacerbate 
future conflicts.102  
As an example of the QDR’s concerns, 
consider  the challenges peak oil represents to 
US homeland security. Persistent  access to 
affordable fossil fuels like oil is not  only  core 
to the ongoing  health  of the US economy, but 
its success depends on  effective international 
p o l i c y  n e t w o r k s , t r a n s n a t i o n a l  l a w 
enforcement structures, and international 
relations.  For instance,  energy  use/inputs in 
the form  of oil and gas-related products (e.g., 
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nitrogen fertilizers,  fuel for  farming), 
machine production,  and transportation  of 
food to distant markets have become central 
to modern  agriculture productivity  and food 
distribution.  The rising  price of oil is thought 
to be caused,  at  least  in  part, by  a 
combination  of the inevitable depletion  of oil 
and gas reserves (supply)  and rising  global 
use of fossil fuels and transportation 
(demand).  Since food production  in  the 
developed world is incredibly  oil  intensive,  as 
the price of oil increases, the price of food 
follows.  Clearly  a  political concern  in  the 
United States,  rising food prices are 
particularly  traumatic for those in  less 
developed countries.  Consequently,  as food 
becomes increasingly  expensive,  mass 
migrations of populations seeking  better 
opportunities can  be expected. Such 
migrations become major  stressors to the 
economies and governments of both 
receiving  nations and to the nations who are 
losing the skills and talents of their populace.
Table 4:  Characteristics of Lens IV – Terrorism as a Collaborative Nexus
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article is to begin  the 
effort  to build a theoretical  foundation  for 
homeland security  by  creating  a  framework 
based on four  distinct  conceptual lenses 
developed from  the academic literature in the 
fields of criminology, international relations, 
organization  studies,  risk management,  and 
public  administration. These conceptual 
lenses include (1) homeland security  as a 
criminal justice  problem, with  terrorism 
viewed as crime; (2) homeland security  as a 
international relations problem,  with 
terrorism  viewed as war; (3) homeland 
Security  as an  organization  design  problem, 
with  terrorism  viewed as a  network of 
transnational,  sub-state actors; and (4) 
homeland security  as a  collaborative nexus of 
the law  enforcement,  diplomatic, and 
network lenses that  culminates in  the notion 
of environmental  security.  Each  conceptual 
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lens consists of theories,  practices, values, 
beliefs, and assumptions that can  serve to 
shape how  critical  events are perceived,  and 
as such,  how  these events are understood and 
the problems addressed in the form  of 
homeland security  programs and policies. 
The fields of criminology, organization 
t h e o r y ,  p u b l i c  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , a n d 
international relations each bring unique 
theoretical perspectives that contribute 
significantly  to our  understanding  of 
homeland security, but  none of the lenses 
individually  provides an  adequate picture of 
the challenges of homeland security  theory  or 
policies needed to address modern  threats 
and hazards.  
Homeland security  is a  complex  problem 
that spans many  academic  disciplines, 
professions,  and organizational  boundaries. 
It encompasses both  foreign  and domestic 
policy  issues,  and involves government 
organizations at  all levels,  as well  as 
businesses,  nonprofit  organizations, and 
citizens.  In fact, homeland security  is so 
complex  that  multiple perspectives are 
needed to analyze the phenomenon  because 
one perspective simply  misses too much, or 
fails to see critical pieces of the problem  that 
need to be addressed. Thus, further  research 
should be encouraged that  is interdisciplinary 
and seeks to break down  some of the 
disciplinary  barriers within  the field of 
homeland security.  This requires a  focus on 
processes and incentives that will bring 
scholars and policymakers with  these 
different perspectives together.  
It is clear  that conceptual lenses heavily 
influence whether we will be aware of new 
problems,  how  we give meaning  to what  we 
observe, and how  we perceive or  understand 
new  phenomenon. Unexpected changes are 
often  difficult to perceive, let  alone address 
because they  simply  are not  captured within 
our  mental maps or  conceptual lenses that we 
use to make sense of the world. To ensure we 
are not  surprised by  another  9/11, it is critical 
that  we continue to broaden  our conceptual 
lenses as it relates to homeland security.  
In  the rapidly  changing  environment of 
the information  age, problems are constantly 
morphing  into new  forms,  thus the life cycle 
of any  particular  solution  is likely  to be very 
short. Thus, an  important  challenge for 
scholars and government  leaders is to lead 
the process of continuing to analyze our 
existing conceptual lenses as they  relate to 
homeland security,  as well  as to lead the 
process of constructing  new  conceptual 
lenses.  A  useful next  step would be to apply 
the lenses to a  number  of terrorist  attacks 
and conduct  a  multiple case study. Multiple 
frame analysis can  be used to analyze critical 
cases such  as the attacks on  the World Trade 
Center  in  1993  and 2001. A  comparative 
analysis of these two events can  be conducted 
to see how  our  conceptual  lenses and 
perceptions have changed over  time. In 
addition,  further  research  is needed on  the 
lenses used in  multiple frame analysis in 
order  to more clearly  define the theories, 
concepts,  definitions,  and principles in  each. 
Also, additional  lenses can  be added to the 
framework  such as those that  look at 
homeland security  from  an  emergency 
management,  public health,  or  r isk 
management  perspective and applied to other 
cases. Also, further  research is needed to 
understand how  these conceptual lenses are 
formed and shared,  and changed within 
government  organizations,  as well as among 
elected officials. The use of multiple lenses in 
analyzing complex  phenomenon  such  as 
homeland security  is important because 
when  used alone, one perspective or  lens can 
miss key  elements and captures only  a  small 
part of the phenomenon  we are observing. 
Using  multiple perspectives allows us to 
develop explanations that  help us understand 
specific aspects of homeland security  as well 
as identify  alternative paradigms that  serve to 
help transform  our  theories, traditions, rules, 
and standards of practice.  
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